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I.  DIFFERENT POINTS OF DEPARTURE
1
Active protection of the environment began in both the United States and
Europe in the 1960s, though many measures in the area of water management,
nature protection, town and country planning, and waste management were
adopted earlier. The political, legislative and administrative actions in the years
following the publication of Rachel Carson's famous book Silent Spring led, on
both sides of the Atlantic, to more organized, deliberate and planned measures
which, since that time, have come to be grouped under the term "environmental
policy".
Yet this coincidence in time clouds the fact that the points of departure
for the United States and Europe were completely different. Indeed, in the
1960s the European Union
2 did not even exist by its present name, and the
underlying argument of this paper is that a comparison between the United
States and "Europe" does not do justice to the European integration process nor
does it help to facilitate understanding of present or future developments.
When the United States started to develop an active environmental policy,
it was a sovereign nation state which possessed all the constitutional,
institutional, economic, and political requirements to conceive and implement a
coherent and consistent environmental policy at home and abroad.  However,
until the 1960s water and air issues were mainly dealt with at the level of the
individual states within the U.S. Growing public concern about environmental
pollution caused Congress to adopt federal air pollution legislation in 1965 and
1967 which was considerably reinforced by the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 which were, in later years, extended and finetuned. A similar development
ocurred in the water sector: relatively soft federal provisions of 1965 were
considerably sharpened and "federalized" by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972.  President Richard Nixon established the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which received powerful and
comprehensive regulatory implementating and enforcing functions from
Congress. Responsibility for other parts of environmental policy was also
largely in the hands of Congress: product and process legislation was
traditionally dealt with by Congress under the Interstate Commerce Clause. The
fact that the federal government owned about one-third of the land in the United
States facilitated  the taking of nature conservation measures, without serious
interference with private property or the prerogatives of the states. Furthermore,
Congress had the power to levy taxes and charges and used it to introduce
pollution taxes and subsidies, in particular for state environmental measures.
Overall, since the end of the 1960s, a number of strong, extremely detailed and
prescriptive legislative instruments have been adopted, which, together with4
federal executive institutions, have formed the backbone of United States
environmental policy ever since.
The European Union was in a quite different situation. It was not a
nation, but a supranational joint venture of nation-states (fifteen at present) that
could only act where the EC Treaty expressly so provided. Its Member States
had very different perceptions and objectives of the European integration
process; this, in turn, influenced their attitude to day-to-day Community
decisions.
Environmental concerns in Europe developed at the level of EC Member
States; they concerned different subjects, with variable intensity, consequences
and reactions from the national legislatures and policy makers. The European
situation should be compared not with that of the United States but with that of
all all  the States of Northern and Central America in order to understand the
importance of the "sovereignty" of the nation-State.  Sovereignty was at the
core of all sorts of difficulties that slowed down European integration and
consequently the making of common European environmental standards.
The EC Treaty of 1958 did not contain any explicit reference to the
environment or to environmental policy; explicit provisions on environmental
policy were not introduced in it until the Single European Act of 1987
3. Also,
the EC Treaty was not  and is not  a constitution for the European Union.
  The Treaty allows the Community institutions  the "federal level" in U.S.
terminology  to act only when they are entitled to do so under the Treaty
provisions. The basic competence for dealing with (environmental) matters
is vested in the EC Member States. While, in theory, this might not be very
different from U.S. law, Congress may, in practice, deal with almost all
matters of environmental law and policy, in particular as regards pollution
control, environmental subsidies, product and production standards, and land
use.
  There is no European "Congress". European Community environmental
legislation is adopted jointly by the Council of Ministers which is composed
of representatives of the governments of Member States, and by the
European Parliament, the members of which are directly elected. This means
that Member States have a decisive influence on the question of which
environmental matters they want regulated at "federal level" and which they
prefer to keep for themselves. The European Parliament cannot overturn the
Council; and the European Commission only has the right to propose
legislation, not to adopt it.5
  The European Union does not own land and most EC Member States do not
own significant amounts of land either.
  The European Union has practically no income of its own; it receives a fixed
percentage (1.27 percent) of the national income of Member States which
makes it practically impossible to influence environmental changes within
the European Union by economic or fiscal incentives or subsidies.
  The European Union has no power to levy environmental taxes, unless all
Member States unanimously agree in Council which they have not done
so far.
To these "constitutional" differences have to be added the political, economic,
social, cultural, and environmental differences among the constituent members
of the European Union, and the absence of European media (television, press,
radio), of a European public opinion, and of a European-wide common interest
which could be formulated, promoted or defended at some level.
II. THE PERIOD TO THE MID-1980S
Environmental policy in the United States was marked from the beginning of
the 1970s by strong centralization; the adoption of federal legislation
concerning air and water pollution, industrial permitting, nature protection and
soil clean-up policies; and powerful enforcement mechanisms, in particular via
the EPA. During the 1970s, EPA and other federal agencies pursued a vigorous
and robust policy of standard-setting and enforcement of environmental
standards.
This centralized policy approach, though it might not have been all-
embracing and comprehensive, came progressively under attack from sources
which favored environmental policy at state level and, more importantly, from
economists and regulated businesses. EPA's activity was seen as excessively
interfering with the market and not giving due account to economic
considerations. In the early 1980s, deregulation was started by the Reagan
administration, and while the basic environmental legislation adopted by
Congress was not abolished, the regulatory responsibilities of EPA were
narrowed and measures taken to return greater responsibility to the states for
regulating the environment. President Reagan's Executive Order 12291 required
EPA and other federal regulatory agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses of
all regulatory proposals and adopt the most economically efficient or cost-
effective alternative. Compliance with those requirements was policed not by
the courts, but by the Office of Management and Budget
4. Also, economic
impact assessment requirements and other economic barriers to environmental
regulations were established.6
  The United States was represented in international environmental
negotiations by the State Department and the Department of Commerce. Little
consideration was given to the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of the
Environment or to international representation by the EPA. This fact
demonstrates that environmental concerns remained secondary to trade and
economic considerations in United States external policy.
European environmental policy developed only slowly, with adoption of
specific measures aimed at tackling a specific problem. The first EU
environmental directives date from 1975 and dealt with waste oils, the quality
of surface waters, wastes and the quality of bathing waters
5.    They were
followed by product-related provisions, and subsequently, after the end of the
1970s, by provisions on nature protection and air quality. Industrial accidents
and the problem of Waldsterben  (dying forests), which was attributed to
environmental causes, increased public and political concern in Western
Europe.  This allowed the adoption at EU level of new environmental directives
that  showed strong concern for health issues, frequently took a preventive
approach, and progressively encompassed all areas of environmental policy.
Thus, when the EC Treaty was amended in the mid-1980s, there was a general
consensus among Member States that provisions for a comprehensive European
Community environmental policy should be added. The new Treaty provisions
in the Single European Act which entered into effect in 1987 laid down, among
others, objectives and principles of environmental policy based on objectives
and policies which the European Union and its Member States had agreed to in
1973, underlining thus the continuity and consistency of this policy. Cost-
benefit considerations were mentioned, but in the sense that actors should take
account of the advantages and charges of environmental action or lack of
action
6.
EU environmental legislation was negotiated not by the Member States'
foreign affairs ministries or trade departments, but by the environmental
departments that had progressively been established within the Member States
since the early 1970s. Because the European Commission, which has a
monopoly on initiating legislative proposals under the EC Treaty, also had an
environmental department since the early 1970s, environmental matters were,
from the very  beginning of European environmental policy, kept outside the
direct influence of Member States' foreign policy or trade policy, and EU
environmental policy was accepted as being autonomous from commercial and
foreign policy.
As regards the international level, the European Union had no overall
general competence to act. It had responsibilities for commercial matters, but
the exact extent and content of this competence was constantly disputed by7
Member States which, in the name of national sovereignty, preferred to be
represented separately on the international scene rather than as part of the
European Union. These differences of view on commercial policy issues
favored a development of foreign environmental policy which was independent
from commercial policy and general foreign policy.
As a consequence, when the European Union appeared at  international
level for discussions on environmental matters, it was mainly represented by the
environmental directorate general of the European Commission and by (some or
all) environmental departments of the EU Member States. In order to find a
common European position, long concertations prior to and during international
negotiations were necessary, and where a consensus was not reached,  the
Commission of the European Communities defended what it considered to be
the European Union interest, while individual Member States often promoted
their own interests. This incapacity of speaking with one voice often irritated
representatives of other nations  who did not fully understand these
consequences of the European efforts to progressively integrate sovereign
States into one European Union. In general,  prior to 1987 the European Union
was almost never noted as being one autonomous body in international
environmental negotiations; rather, the larger EU Member States such as
France, United Kingdom or Germany dominated the scene. This is why the
publications of this period hardly ever mention the European Union's foreign
environmental policy and law
7.
Global environmental conventions prior to 1985 were generally only
open to signature by States, not by regional integration bodies such as the
European Union. However, European regional environmental conventions
increasingly provided for signature by the European Union from the mid-1970s
on. The first important convention to provide for the European Union's
accession was the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP) of 1979
8.  That convention was generated by efforts after 1975 to
improve East-West political relations. The European Union had asked to have a
clause inserted into the Convention according to which "regional economic
integration organisations" could accede to it. The Soviet Union, which was very
interested in establishing the Convention, opposed such a clause; thus the
United States could not, as a member of the Western camp, oppose it too
vehemently! Finally, the Soviet Union accepted the clause and the United States
was satisfied to bring the European Union into the East-West dialogue.
However, after 1981 the United States, led by the State Department,
changed policy and opposed European Union accession to global environmental
Conventions. The U.S. tried for several years to allow such accession only
under the two conditions: (a) that the European Union made a precise statement8
on the Community competence in the subject-matter dealt with by the
convention in question (declaration of competence). This was difficult for the
European Union, as its founding Treaty is not a constitution and therefore the
repartition of competences between the European Union and its Member States
is not static, but evolving; and (b) that a majority of EU Member States had also
ratified the convention in question.
The European Union invoked the precedent of the LRTAP Convention
and slowly obtained inclusion of the same clause as in that Convention in other
agreements. From time to time it made a declaration concerning competence
9.
However, these declarations did not really clarify anything. And the divergence
with the United States on the European Union's accession to conventions did
not disappear: for instance in 1983 the European Union achieved an amendment
to the CITES Convention on trade in endangered species, to allow its accession.
The United States was  not in favor of this accession and has not, to this day,
ratified this amendment; it seems to have encouraged other contracting States
not to ratify it either. As a consequence, the amendment has not yet been ratified
by the necessary number of contracting parties, so that the European Union
cannot adhere to that Convention. While the EU had completely transposed the
requirements of the CITES Convention into European law, it was thus formally
barred from speaking with one voice at the CITES conferences and neither the
United States nor other contracting parties have made particular efforts to
improve this unpleasant situation.
Bilaterally, the United States and the Commission of the European
Communities exchanged, as early as 1974, letters to promote cooperation in
environmental matters
10. It is rather typical that these letters were signed, for the
European Commission, by the Commissioner responsible of environmental
affairs and for the United States by the Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Environmental Affairs in the State Department. The cooperation was to
concentrate on the exchange of information on environmental issues. As the
United States did not have an environmental department and might have been
unwilling to let the Environmental Protection Agency animate this cooperation,
the Department of Commerce and the State Department conceived the bilateral
meetings from their very beginnings in particular as an exchange of information
under trade and commercial auspices. However, such discussions had less
interest for the European Commission for which the environmental department
was the leading interlocutor. Thus, the bilateral meetings which were organized
more or less every two years, focused on matters which concerned potential
trade conflicts. Intensive technical cooperation took place in matters such as
chemical and air pollution, and useful results were reached. In contrast, hardly
any time was devoted to questions of how environmental degradation could be
prevented or repaired at national or international level, what lessons were to be9
learned from legislation adopted so far, and what new concepts or measures
might be developed to combat environmental impairment in the future.10
III. THE PERIOD SINCE THE MID-1980S
In the United States, environmental protection measures have mainly focused
on the administration of federal statutes and attempts to establish cost-benefit
and risk assessment as conditions for federal action
11. Divergence of views
between the Executive and Congress on basic questions has frequently
paralysed legislative measures and prevented innovative new measures.
In Europe, after the Single European Act, the evolution of environmental
policy was marked by the re-evaluation of the objectives of environmental
policy; continued attempts to integrate environmental requirements into other
policy areas such as transport, energy, regional policy, agriculture and industry;
greater coherence and covering of new areas of environmental legislation to
progressively align national environmental policies; and increasing attention to
climate change issues, which gradually became a top political priority. Also,
Europe imported tools such as environmental impact assessments, access to
information and environmental management systems from the United States;
other tools, though, were rejected, such as a "superfund" system for repair of
environmental damage, an environmental liability system, and an enforcement
agency modeled after the EPA.
On the international scene, when the Vienna Convention on the
Protection of the Ozone Layer  was negotiated in 1985 under the auspices of
UNEP, the European Union achieved, against considerable objections more
from the United States than from the Soviet Union, the insertion of a provision
into the Convention which allowed accession to the Convention by regional
economic organizations
12. As a consequence, the Montreal Protocol
negotiations which concerned the restriction of production, use and
consumption of ozone-depleting substances, was, for the European side, to a
large extent led by the European Community which managed successfully to
find common language for all its Member States and to speak with one voice.
This joint European position produced a Protocol in which the United States did
not fully impose its position, but had to accept considerable concessions. The
European Union even obtained a clause which allowed joint implementation of
the obligations under the Protocol
13.
The negotiations on the Montreal Protocol were the first ones at
international level in which the European Union and the United States
confronted each other on environmental matters. The Member States of the
European Union realized that their negotiating position was greatly improved
by acting under the umbrella of the European Union and that the collective gain
achieved by this approach outweighed the political advantages of each State
negotiating for itself. They also discovered that the fact of the the negotiations11
being led by the environmental department of the European Commission,
together with the EU Council Presidency, did not mean tha their national or the
joint European economic interests would be neglected.
This outcome encouraged the European Union to appear more frequently
in international environmental negotiations with an agreed negotiating mandate
and to try to speak with one voice. Despite many setbacks this policy was,
overall, successful, due in particular to the following factors:
  The Single European Act (1987) gave the European Union a mandate to
contribute to the search for solutions to global environmental problems and
clarified that the European Union had the competence to act internationally,
both aside from and jointly with its Member States. The new obligation
under the EC Treaty to promote a high level of environmental protection
within the European Union and worldwide favored efforts to reach
environmentally sound solutions in international negotiations; hence the
European Union did not try to subordinate environmental interests to
commercial or economic interests and did not enter international
negotiations with the explicit or implicit concept of agreeing only to
solutions that were profitable to the European economy.
  Environmental legislation within the European Union progressively covered
more areas, became more coherent and managed to give a political and legal
framework to environmental measures in all Member States of the European
Union. The former national policies in the area of the environment were thus
more and more aligned. The solutions found at European Union level thus
served as the basis for positions and compromise proposals that were put
forward during international negotiations.
  Europe was normally represented at international environmental
conferences, meetings and negotiations by the environmental departments of
Member States and the European Commission's directorate for
environmental affairs; the Member State holding the Presidency of the EU
Council and the Commission acted as spokespersons. This was in marked
contrast to the United States, whose delegations were normally led by the
State Department or the Department of Commerce, but practically never by
EPA, and on which the state-level environmental offices (of California,
Texas, etc.) were never represented.
When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed and the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe emerged as fully sovereign nations, and
the United States remained the only global player. Some cooperation was
established between the U.S. and the European Union in Central and Eastern12
Europe, particularly in setting up of the Regional Environmental Center for
Central and Eastern Europe in Hungary 1990. However, this cooperation
remained marginal, as each side tried to promote its own way of life as a model
for Eastern Europe, even in environmental matters. While the United States
acted much more speedily and efficiently in the beginning, the European Union
took a progressively stronger position as countries in Central and Eastern
Europe began to seek membership in the European Union and thus started to
adapt their environmental legislation and institutional systems to those of the
EU. At global level, the European Union got the general impression that
worldwide environmental problems were seen by the United States mainly in
terms of economic globalization. This impression was based on:
  discussions in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in which the United States opposed consideration of
environmental aspects;
  negotiations at the Rio Conference of 1992, where the United States rejected
precise targets and timetables for greenhouse gas reductions and, more
generally, refused to accept broad environmental texts on which to base
global environmental measures for the next decade; e.g., the thorough
scrutiny of the Declaration on Environment and Development by the U.S.
State Department which led to the rejection, by the United States, of the
words "precautionary principle" in favor of the words "precautionary
approach";
  discussions on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where
only strong internal pressure from environmental groups got some
environmental considerations incorporated into the Agreement and
accompanying Side Agreement;
  the negotiations of various global conventions, in particular the Basel
Convention on the shipment of hazardous waste, the Protocols to the Geneva
Convention on long range transboundary of air pollution, the New York
Convention on  Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as others.
At all these international discussions, the United States was seen as trying to
subordinate environmental questions to economy/trade issues and to avoid, if
possible, any substantive environmental provisions at all;
  continued attempts by the United States to have points removed from the
agenda of the United Nations Environment Programme and to reduce the
funds made available to UNEP.13
The fact that Al Gore, author of Earth in the Balance: Ecology and
Human Spirit in which he had pleaded for a global Marshall Plan for
sustainable development, became Vice-President of the United States, but was
not able, in any way, to politically advance or even discuss the environmental
ideas which he had proposed in his book, clearly demonstrated the preponderant
influence that economic interests had gained in the United States.
An illustration of these issues is the controversy on the noise level of
airplanes. As ICAO, the international body on civil aviation question, had not
revised the international noise standards for airplanes since 1977, the European
Union finally adopted stricter European standards in 1999 which the United
States considered protectionist and discriminating
14. The European Union
offered to consider delaying their application if the United States showed
willingness to push ICAO to adopt more stringent global standards. The United
States, however, filed an official complaint and asked the European Union to
adopt a more economical solution.
In waste management, the United States favored the so-called prior
informed consent (PIC) approach for exports of hazardous waste to developing
countries. Under this PIC approach the importing country obtains the relevant
information and then decides whether it accepts the material or not. The
European Union, however, accepted the argument put forward by NGOs that, in
principle, hazardous waste should not be exported to developing countries at all.
The EU thus negotiated and agreed to the introduction of such an export ban
under the Basel Convention on the shipment of hazardous waste
15. In contrast,
the United States did not ratify the Basel Convention or its amendment on the
export ban.
As regards the export of chemicals, the European Union progressively
sharpened its position, accepting first the PIC approach and moving then
towards the elaboration of an international convention under which the most
dangerous chemicals should be banned altogether. These efforts led to the
signature of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP)
in 2001, to which the United States also finally agreed.
The same pattern can be seen earlier on the issue of leghold traps which
the European Union had banned from use. To protect wild animal welfare, the
EU had added an import ban on furs from specific wild animals that came from
countries which had not banned leghold traps. While the European Union hoped
for worldwide standards on humane trapping of animals, it was forced by
several countries led by the United States to withdraw its import ban. No
serious effort was subsequently made to enact worldwide humane trapping
standards.14
Other examples which cannot be discussed here for lack of space,
concern the negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the general
discussions on biotechnology, on artificial growth promoters in meat, on heavy
metals in specific products (batteries, cars, electrical and electronic goods),
ecolabels, or standards for environmental management systems.
The increasing difference of view on global environmental issues
culminated in the discussions on climate change and the conclusion of the
Kyoto Protocol. The European Union saw the Kyoto Protocol as a prolongation
of the commitments accepted under the Climate Change Convention
16. The
United States considered the Kyoto Protocol flawed, essentially because (a) it
only contained obligations for industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, but not for developing countries. The United States considered
climate change a long-term problem which could and should be thoroughly
researched before action was taken; and in this long-term perspective (as far out
as 2100) the U.S. argued that developing countries, too, should contribute to the
reductions;  (b) the Kyoto Protocol did not expressly enable industrialized
countries to comply with their reduction commitments by investing in reduction
technologies in developing countries or otherwise allow industrialized countries
to meet their obligations in ways that would not require emission reductions at
home. For Europeans, it was remarkable to see that the United States did not
offer an alternative solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and did not
either pursue any consistent policy at home.
Finally, bilateral environmental meetings between the U.S. Government
and the European Commission took place at almost annual intervals during the
1980s and the first half of the 1990s. These meetings covered a very broad
range of subjects, such as the attitude to adopt in different international forums,
product-related issues, biotechnology, and biodiversity. Their focus was again
largely on the prevention of barriers to trade, less on the optimum protection of
the environment. This emphasis, together with formal procedures within the
context of WTO and other forums such as ICAO, slowly reduced the
importance of the environmental aspects of the files, which in turn had the
effect of decreasing technical interest in such discussions. In contrast, bilateral
technical discussions on specific files such as analysis standards or test methods
for specific products continued and often produced satisfactory results.
IV. DIVERGENCIES AND THEIR CAUSES
The main differences between the United States in the concept of approaching
environmental problems are the following:15
(1) As in its internal situation, the European Union sees globalization
more and more clearly as including, with the same degree of importance, trade
issues, environmental concerns and social questions. A correct balance between
the diverging interests has to be found on a case-by-case basis.  In contrast to
that the United States works towards global institutions and instruments which
give greater importance to economic aspects of free trade than to environmental
protection. The global market is to be interfered with as little as possible by
environmental considerations. Globalization is thus as far as possible, economic
globalization.
(2) Since the European Union does not see itself as a global
playerperhaps apart from agricultural matters which are not to be discussed
here  it is a feature of its foreign environmental policy to look for multilateral
solutions that are globally acceptable. These solutions might even appear to be
not to the best advantage of European economic interests.
The United States tends to perceive international environmental
negotiations as international trade negotiations. This leads it to defend interests
that sometimes appear to be those of United States industry, not those of the
global environment.
(3) The nation-states forming the European Union accept that their
sovereignty is affected by the Treaty on European Union and that the European
Court of Justice controls their legislative, regulatory and administrative
environmental activity to ensure its compatibility with the EC Treaty and its
principles, as well as with legislation adopted by the European Union.
Therefore, not only do they have few fundamental problems in accepting global
solutions that do not entirely conform to their economic interests and
preferences, but they are also prepared to accept compliance mechanisms and
control procedures which further encroach on their sovereignty. By contrast, the
United States appears to accept binding commitments and obligations by the
international community and influencing its policy at home only when this
brings economic advantage. While internal enforcement mechanisms and
control procedures by the administration and by the courts are quite strong, the
United States does not seem to accept that international environmental law also
needs strong compliance mechanisms and control procedures which might even
impinge on national sovereignty.
These differences have many causes, among which the following appear
to be the most important:
(a) Traditionally, Europe has had a stronger commitment to social and,
more recently, to environmental concerns than the United States. The idea of16
Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations that an individual who acts in his own self-
interest and intends only his own gain "is led by an invisible hand to promote...
the public interest" has had strong support in U.S. economic theory, legislation
and regulatory practice, but has never gained the same importance in Europe.
Governments were seen as charged not only to promote individual life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness, but also to reduce inequalities in society. This led
to far-reaching interventions in the social area and, more recently, in the
environmental area. There is  with many nuances from one Member State to
the other  a sort of consensus in the European society that public intervention
must also ensure a decent  state of the environment and that environmental
protection cannot be left to market forces. Thus, while many businesses in the
United States might be philosophically opposed to the current regime of
environmental regulation and consider it illegitimate
17, this attitude does not
exist in this form in Europe, where the environmental departments do not
consider themselves the spokespersons of vested economic interests.
(b) In the United States, environmental protection policy was perceived as
a centralizing policy that attracted criticism in conservative circles that opposed
State intervention in the market and from those favoring states' rights. This
coalition gained considerable influence in policy circles as well as in academic
and public opinion.
In Europe the majority of EC Member States are convinced of the
necessity to pursue a vigorous and active environmental policy which includes
market interference; and as Member States have established an Environmental
Department of their own in the European Commission, EU measures are seen
less as centralizing than as integrating or harmonizing measures. There are
certainly conservative and business objections to aspects of environmental
policy in Europe as well, and under their influence policy has sometimes
undergone considerable changes. However, the objections to European
environmental policy have not taken on a fundamental character, and EC
Member States would probably prefer to pursue national policies again rather
than accept European environmental policy that gives too much weight to
business interests.
(c) The United States considers discussions within the European Union
and the international discussion as often not "scientifically sound" since cost-
benefit considerations and risk assessments do not play a preponderant role in
them. It takes the view that the United States approach to cost-benefit and risk
analysis constitutes such sound science. In Europe, approaches based on
economic theory have not gained the same influence on environmental policy,
particularly since opinions other than those of economists--such as those from
natural science (biology, geology, geography), philosophy, religion, social17
science (history, political science, law)  are heard in public and contribute to
forming public and political opinion. Furthermore, the concepts of cost-benefit,
risk assessment and life-cycle analysis are regarded, in marked contrast to the
United States, as not scientifically sound, because economists have not
managed to develop generally acceptable, reliable standards for measuring the
benefits of an unimpaired environment or for expressing in money terms such
things as the loss of biodiversity. Market instruments such as environmental
taxes and charges and emission trading instruments are also used within the
European Union, but more cautiously and without the belief that the market is a
remedy to all or most environmental problems.
Expressed in simple terms, the general feeling in Europe was and is that
there are environmental assets that money cannot buy, and  that the United
States considers "cost" to be the cost of a measure to business, but does not
include, in its cost-benefit considerations, advantages and disadvantages of a
measure to the society as a whole, including future generations.
In this context, it should be noted that the United States does not apply
the principles of cost-benefit anlysis, life-cycle analysis, or risk assessment to
legislative decisions taken by Congress; of course, Congress does not require
cost-benefit analyses on environmental aspects of the National Missile Defense
System, the decision to drill for oil in Alaska, or the decision not to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Rather, the economic principles mentioned
are applied to regulatory measures taken by EPA and others. As Europe has no
regulatory agency compararable to EPA, either at European ("federal") or at
State level, most of its regulatory environomental measures are adopted by the
European or national legislatures. Europeans therefore frequently consider the
American request for more consideration of the above-mentioned economic
principles as misplaced.
(d) Overall, in Europe protection of the environment--like social rights,
gender equality or human rights--is perceived as part of the foundations of any
society. All opinion polls show that there is a consensus on the need to protect
the environment, to reduce pollution, protect biodiversity, and promote changes
that go beyond the consumption society; and that people are gradually
becoming accustomed to the idea that changes in lifestyle are necessary. It is
true that the green political parties in several Member States that have appeared
since the early 1980s seldom represent more than ten percent of the electorate.
However, the influence of their political thinking goes far beyond that
percentage and has brought considerable changes in traditional political parties
and general policy thinking. And the European Union Member States which
promote a strong, consistent and progressive environmental policy do not fare
less well economically than the Member States with weak environmental18
policies. They believe that investing in clean technologies, alternative energy,
environmental techniques pays off and that the environmental challenge is a
powerful and new stimulus for innovation and modernization. This consensus
has also often been influenced by environmental accidents or setbacks which
demonstrated that public authorities can not be allowed to neglect
environmental concerns
18.
Discussion of environmental issues within the United States and by the
United States in international forums gives Europeans the impression that
environmental policy is considered as a fashion in the U.S., without much
consequence for things that really matter in society. Notions of  "prevention"
and "precaution", the principle of  "polluter pays", and the need to integrate
environmental requirements into energy and transport, agriculture, industrial
and foreign policy, do not seem to play an important role in American political
debate.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that at the global level,  conceptual differences
between Europe and the United States have led to different approaches to
environmental issues. Though these differences began to become manifest
during the 1980s, the end of the East-West conflict did not significantly
contribute to the divergence. Rather, by that time, on the one hand, the
European Union was more systematically represented on the international
scene, backed by a generally accepted set of principles and objectives in the EU
Treaty and by fairly strong internal legislation that facilitated a consensus
among Europeans in global negotiations; while, on the other hand, the
economy-oriented approach to environmental policy that had prevailed in the
U.S since the early 1980s came to dominate its external as well as internal
environmental policies. These trends have contributed significantly to the
present state of affairs which is marked by divergence on several important
global environmental issues and by a relatively cool and distant bilateral
diplomatic relationship.19
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ENDNOTES
1 The author only expresses his personal opinion. He attaches importance to the fact that he
was never directly involved in bilateral discussions with the United States.
2 The term "European Union" is used throughout this contribution, though the original EC
Treaty of 1958 established the "European Economic Community". The term "European
Union" only exists since 1993; it was introduced by a Treaty amendment, to underline the
political objective of the European Community and to take account of and further promote
progressive economic and political  integration of the Member States. The European Union -
unlike the European Community which continues to exist as one of the "pillars" of the
European Union - does not have legal personality; therefore, environmental and other
legislation is adopted by the European Community(EC), not by the European Union(EU).
3 See Articles 174 to 176 EC Treaty (environmental policy), furthermore Article 2 (objectives
of EC), 6 (integration of environmental requirements into other policies) and 95 (environment
and EC-wide free trade) EC Treaty.
4 See T.Smith, Regulatory Reform in the USA and Europe, Journal of Environmental law
1996, p.247(p.263f.); E.Rehbinder-R. Stewart, Environmental Protection Policy, Berlin-New
York 1985, p.303.
5 See Directive 75/439 (waste oils), OJEC 1975, L194, p.23; Directive 75/440 (surface water)
OJEC 1975, L 194, p.26; Directive 75/442 (waste) OJEC 1975, L 194, p.39; Directive 76/160
(bathing water) OJEC 1976, L 31, p.1.
6 This is the wording of ten of the eleven official languages of the EC Treaty. The English
version alone states "the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action", as it was
considered by the drafters that "costs and benefits  in the English language also included
societal advantages and charges.
7 See E.Rehbinder-R.Stewart (note 4 above); M.Tolba-O.El-Kholy, The World Environment
1972-1992, London 1992; S.Johnson-G.Corcelle, L'autre Europe "verte": la politique
communautaire de l'environnement, Paris-Bruxelles 1987; Commission of the European
Communities, COM(80) 222 of 7 May 1980.
8 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air pollution of 13 November 1979, UN
Doc.ECE/HLM.1/R.1
9 See, for instance, Declaration on the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone
layer, OJEC 1988, L 297, p.8: "..the Community has competence to take action relating..to the
environment. The Community has exercised its competence..in adopting...The Community
may well exercise its competence in the future by adopting further legislation in this area..".
10 Commission: Method for cooperation between the Commission and the Government of the
United States in environmental matters - exchange of letters, SEC(74) 2518 of 1 July 1974.22
11 See for more details T.Smith, Regulatory reform in the USA and Europe. Journal of
Environmental Policy 1996, p.257; J.Anderson: US environmental law: the challenge of the
next generation.  Environmental Law Review 2000, p.61.
12 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 22 March 1985, OJEC 1988, L
297, p.10.
13 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 16 September 1987,
OJEC 1988, L 297, p.21, Article 2(8).
14 Regulation 925/1999, OJ 1999, L 115, p.1.
15 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal of 22 March 1989, UN Doc.UNEP/IG.80/3; amendment of 1995 on the export
ban (not yet entered into force).
16 See New York Framework Convention on Climate Change of 9 May 1992, OJEC 1994, L
33, p.13, Article 4(2): "The developed country parties..commit themselves specifically as
provided for in the following: (a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking
the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions...".
17 See J.Lofton, Environmental enforcement. The impact of cultural values and attitudes on
social regulation. Environmental Law Reporter 2001, p.10906; R.Stewart Antidotes for the
"American Disease". Ecology Law Quarterly 1993, p.85.
18 Waldsterben (dying forests)(Germany, early 1980s); Rainbow Warrior incident (France
1985; Chernobyl accident (1986, Italy, Austria, Sweden); Braer accident (United Kingdom
1993); mad-cow disease (United Kingdom 1990s); Donana accident (Spain 1998) etc.